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Ebola is a rare yet deadly virus that has recently come to the United States1 and has 
ties to West Texas. While it is not highly contagious because of its means of transmission,1 if 
an outbreak were to occur it has the potential to run rampant in community health care 
settings. Society is poorly educated about this disease, causing widespread fear that translates 
into major social and possible economic implications. While there are biocontainment 
facilities around the United States, their capacity is limited2 and it is predicted smaller towns 
do not have the equipment to support an Ebola epidemic. The aim of this thesis is to examine 
the preparedness of West Texas hospitals to handle cases of Ebola, and to explore the social 
implications that come along with this disease, including the discrimination against people 
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Since Ebola was first recognized in 1976, more than twenty outbreaks have occurred 
in Africa.3 The most recent outbreak began in December 2013, but the first cases were not 
detected until March 2014.  This was the largest Ebola outbreak ever recorded and caused 
extensive health and social issues for those living in the infected areas of West Africa.3 
During the outbreak, the mortality rate was about 55% with 1603 confirmed cases and 887 
deaths by August 2014.3 There was substantial concern that the disease could spread beyond 
the epidemic in West Africa due to air travel.3 This concern became a reality when the 
United States index case occurred in October 2014, causing widespread anxiety. Americans 
were ignorant of the fact that such a foreign disease could come to our country, and simply 
were not prepared. Six total American patients were diagnosed with Ebola as of October 6, 
2014, and they were all infected in Africa.4 The majority of them were transported to the 
United States for treatment before the index case of Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan. Mr. Duncan 
was the first patient treated in the United States in which the hospital treating him had no 
advance notice of his diagnosis.5 Three patients including the index case, Mr. Duncan, and 
nurses who cared for him, Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, were diagnosed in the United 
States, making the number of American patients diagnosed with Ebola rise to 8 (not including 
Mr. Duncan since he is not American).4 Eight total patients were treated in the United States, 
with a total of nine patients affecting the United States. One American patient died in Nigeria 
before he could be transported to the United States for treatment.4 The spread of Ebola in the  
________ 




United States after Mr. Duncan’s case is due in part to inadequate preparedness and lack of 
awareness of such a rare disease in our industrialized nation. 
Two of the Ebola patients had ties to West Texas, Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan (index 
case) and Dr. Kent Brantley. Mr. Duncan’s case sparked the fear of Ebola in the United 
States due to his misdiagnosis, the fact that he infected healthcare workers, and the fatal 
outcome of his disease. Mr. Duncan spent five hours in the Emergency Room of a Dallas 
hospital before he was discharged with a 103° fever.6 The nurses did not obtain his travel 
history even though he complained of abdominal pain, dizziness, nausea, and headaches, all 
of which are known symptoms of Ebola. The nurse also did not let the physician know about 
Mr. Duncan’s recent visit to Africa once she found out.6 These missteps led to Mr. Duncan 
being diagnosed with sinusitis and abdominal pain, delaying the diagnosis until a few days 
later when it was too late.6 Nina Pham, one of the two health care workers infected while 
treating Mr. Duncan, stated the hospital’s lack of training and proper equipment were a main 
reason she was infected. She also stated that the hospital failed to develop policies and train 
its staff for treating Ebola patients.7 Overall, this outbreak in the United States occurred as a 
result of the outbreak over in West Africa. The index case and individuals such as Dr. Kent 
Brantley were infected in Africa and brought the disease back to the United States. Although 
these patients coming to the United States was essentially out of anyone’s control, the 
outbreak caused by the index case could have potentially been prevented if proper protocols 
were in place and were followed. 
Ebola is a rare, yet highly infectious and deadly virus that can infect both primates 




fatality rate along with the fact that there is no efficient treatment makes Ebola “…an 
important public health pathogen and biothreat pathogen of category A”.8 The Ebola virus 
referred to in this paper is the Ebola virus (EBOV), which is one of the five virus species in 
the genus Ebolavirus.3 Ebola is a part of the family Filoviridae in the order of 
Mononegavirales.9 Because of its placement in this family, Ebola is in the group of 
Filoviruses, which are “…enveloped, non-segmented, negative-stranded RNA viruses of 
varying morphology. These viruses have characteristic filamentous particles that give the 
virus family its name. Ebola virus particles have a uniform diameter of 80 nm but can greatly 
vary in length, with lengths up to 14 000 nm.”8 The virus’ genome consists of a single linear 
strand of RNA that is about 19,000 bases long and contains only seven genes. A protein on 
the virus called VP35 helps to shut down the innate immune system by binding to and 
inactivating proteins in the immune response. It also blocks the branch of the innate immune 
system that would allow the virus to be recognized.9 The only genetic material that can be 
duplicated by the enzymes carried by cells is DNA, but RNA encodes Ebola’s genome. 
Because of this, the virus encodes a protein that can copy RNA into RNA, rather than DNA. 
Every copy of the virus has a working polymerase protein packed inside in order to copy the 
viral genome into messenger RNAs that are then translated into proteins by the infected 
cells.9 
 Ebola is a virus associated with viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, mainly in Africa. 
Although outbreaks are relatively rare, localized, and small, this disease, along with the other 
disease that constitutes the family Filoviridae, Marburg, creates fear and media attention due 




as bioweapons.10 Overall, Ebola’s pathogenesis is not well understood;3 however, studies 
have shown that the Ebola virus replicates in monocytes, macrophages, and dendritic cells 
and may be found in endothelial cells, fibroblasts, hepatocytes, and adrenal cells.3 The virus 
can spread to various organs, including the lymph nodes, liver, and spleen. There is little 
inflammatory response involved with the infection, however lymphopenia seems to be a 
marker of prognosis.3 In addition, changes to the inflammatory response and coagulation 
cascade can result in hemorrhage and multi-organ failure.3 While these findings indicate that 
part of Ebola’s pathogenesis is due to its effect on the immune system, other details of its 
pathogenesis are still not well delineated.   
This disease is most commonly found in Africa, where it was discovered in 1976. It 
was discovered near the Ebola River, which is in the Democratic Republic of Congo2. 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), symptoms of this rare 
disease include fever, headache, muscle pain, weakness, fatigue, diarrhea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain and unexplained bleeding or bruising. According to Vanessa and Matthias, 
“Hemorrhagic symptoms such as epistaxis, petechiae, bleeding from mucous membranes, 
and internal bleeding may later develop.”10 If one is thought to have been exposed to Ebola, 
the person must be monitored for three weeks because it can take anywhere from 2 to 21 
days for symptoms to appear.11 It is often difficult to immediately diagnose Ebola, because 
its symptoms are very similar to those of other, more common diseases. Contrary to popular 
belief, Ebola is not airborne. It is transmitted through direct contact with bodily fluids of 
someone who is infected. This includes feces, saliva, sweat, urine, vomit, semen, skin swabs, 




broken skin or mucous membranes or through needle sticks and contact with objects that 
have been infected by an Ebola patient, making the disease highly infectious. Ebola was 
actually named first on the Planet Deadly list of top 10 most infectious diseases, beating out 
cholera, tuberculosis, anthrax, small pox, and MRSA.13 It has also been discovered that the 
virus can stay in both vaginal fluids and semen after the patient has recovered. Therefore, 
those who have been infected are advised to abstain from sex for at least three months after 
recovery.14 In Africa, another source of transmission includes handling infected animals, 
especially bush meat or infected bats.14 
The treatment for this disease has remained relatively unchanged since the 1950s, 
although research has been done to make breakthroughs in this area. No vaccine or antiviral 
drug has been proved to be useful in nonhuman primates after the emergence of symptoms. 
According to del Rio et al., “Recent studies have shown promise for a combination of 
monoclonal antibodies and for a small interfering RNA compound (BCX4430) as a post 
exposure prophylaxis in nonhuman primates. Use of plasma from patients who have 
recovered from infection and recombinant human protein C have also been tried but have 
been reported to be unsuccessful.”3 The rarity and infectious nature of Ebola make 
biocontainment centers necessary for care and proper recovery, and also to ensure the disease 
does not spread. These units are much more prepared for the challenges of this disease in 
comparison to a community hospital because of their vast resources, technology and highly 
trained staff. 
The Ebola virus caused quite a scare in the United States in the eighteen months 




general public about the virus. It is highly unlikely that Ebola would create an epidemic in 
the United States because of its means of transmission and the constant advancements in our 
medical technologies. However, Ebola is such a rare virus that when it did strike the United 
States, it sparked great concern. While it is unlikely to cause mass problems, the potential is 
still there. If an outbreak of Ebola were to happen, the disease can spread very quickly in 
community healthcare settings, especially in rural areas where technology and resources 
cannot compare to those of urban areas. Therefore, with the 2014 outbreak, West Texas had a 
reason to feel uncomfortable because this virus struck too close to home. Two of the cases 
during the most recent outbreak had ties to West Texas. So while it is improbable, if this 
virus had been able to make its way back to West Texas through these two patients, an 
epidemic could have run rampant in the rural hospitals of West Texas. The aim of this thesis 
is to examine the preparedness of West Texas hospitals to handle one or multiple cases of 
Ebola, and to explore the social implications that come along with this disease, including the 
discrimination against people from West Africa and stigmatization of those with or 
recovering from the disease. 
What is needed to treat an Ebola patient? 
  Because of the highly infectious nature of Ebola, protocols to follow with a possible 
Ebola patient are extensive. There has been a major emphasis on planning and in specifying 
protocols to help protect the well-being of healthcare workers who potentially could be 
exposed to a patient with Ebola, while also preventing the spread of the disease in hospitals 
and other health care settings.12 The CDC has suggested that any patients with potential 




precautions. Current recommended personal protective equipment (PPE) includes a full-face 
shield, a fluid resistant or impermeable gown, double examination gloves, impermeable boot 
covers, and apron15, which is more strict than suggested protocols before the October 2014 
outbreak.16 If intubation or a bronchoscopy is to be performed, the CDC recommends 
wearing an “N95 mask and placing the patient in a negative pressure room.” 12 The CDC 
recommends that all healthcare personnel from doctors and nurses, to assistants, laboratory 
personnel, and even people not in patient care (i.e. maintenance, housekeeping, etc.) be 
aware of the precautions recommended for preventing Ebola transmission in United States 
hospitals. This includes isolating the patient in a room where there is appropriate and 
consistent use of PPE and maintaining a log which tracks all people who have entered the 
room. In addition, disposable medical equipment is advised for treatment of an Ebola patient. 
If the equipment is non-disposable and non-dedicated to the specific patient, it should be 
cleaned and disinfected according to hospital policies. In addition, limited use of needles is 
recommended, but if needed, they should be handled with extreme care and placed in 
puncture-proof and sealed containers.17 Other precautions that are stressed include hand 
hygiene, environmental infection control, safe injection practices, and monitoring/ 
management of potentially exposed personnel.17 PPE is an essential part of the Ebola 
prevention protocol. Before anyone can work with an Ebola patient, they must have 
completed repeated training and demonstrate that they understand proper procedures for 
putting on (donning) and removing (doffing) PPE.15 It is important that no skin is exposed 
and that the donning and doffing procedures are observed by an onsite manager, whose main 




setting. Once put on, the PPE should not be modified or adjusted while in the patient’s area.15 
To remove the PPE, it is important that the utmost precautions are taken, since it is possible 
that the PPE is infected by bodily fluids of the Ebola patient. It must be removed slowly and 
deliberately with oversight by a trained observer whose responsibility is to read out the step-
by-step procedure of donning and doffing of the PPE. This observer also wears 
recommended PPE during the observation of the donning and doffing. This includes an 
impermeable gown, a full-face shield, two pairs of examination gloves, and impermeable 
shoe covers.15 It is also of the utmost importance that a donning and doffing area is 
designated in the health care facility, along with appropriate signs indicating the given area 
along with signs and warning on the patient's room.15 
  The CDC has developed a strategy to help hospitals be ready to provide different 
levels of care to a patient with possible Ebola. There are three “categories” of hospital 
settings. The first is a frontline healthcare facility. This facility would quickly identify and 
isolate a patient if they are thought to have Ebola, then notify infection control personnel at 
that location as well as state and local health officials. This facility only has enough personal 
protection equipment for up to one day of care, with a limited amount of health care 
professionals caring for this single patient. Because of this, they usually are going to prepare 
the patient for transfer to an Ebola assessment hospital.18 Here, the patient with possible 
Ebola remains isolated and receives immediate laboratory evaluation and testing for Ebola. 
This facility has enough Ebola PPE for up to 5 days of care, so after this amount of time, the 
patient would need to be transported to an Ebola Treatment Center; these facilities amount to 




be isolated in a biocontainment room. Here the patient will be cared for, for the remainder of 
their illness. While these locations only have enough PPE for a week of care, there is a 
staffing plan in place so several weeks of care is manageable. Here, the CDC Ebola Response 
Teams are ready to provide assistance if it is needed. Although each of the biocontainment 
locations differ slightly in their readiness and treatment levels for the patient, all facilities are 
required to have staff that have been trained in the use and safety practices of PPE, systems 
that allow safe disposal of Ebola wastes and cleaning/disinfection, and strict adherence to 
infection control protocols.18 These biocontainment facilities were created to prevent the 
spread of both highly infectious and highly contagious diseases.  
      Ebola is classified as a Category A infectious substance which is defined as “An 
infectious substance which is transported in a form that, when exposure to it occurs, is 
capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening or fatal disease in otherwise 
healthy humans or animals.”19 Ebola is highly infectious because only a few viral particles 
(1-10) are needed to infect an individual.20 For example, once a patient has developed 
symptoms of Ebola only one drop of bodily fluids can have as many as 500,000 viral 
particles in it.20 To compare the infectious nature of Ebola, 55 particles of Norovirus are 
needed for infection, 1000 for Streptococcus, and for E.coli to be infectious billions of 
particles are needed.20 While Ebola is highly infectious, it is not considered highly 
contagious due to its means of transmission. A person only becomes contagious once they 
begin showing symptoms.21 Simply being in the presence of a person with Ebola cannot 
infect you. The disease is not easy to get when compared to an infectious and contagious 




just mere contact, which may be why Ebola travels through a population about nine times 
slower than the measles.21 Epidemiologists have calculated a reproduction number to 
estimate the number of individuals who contract a disease from an infected and contagious 
individual, denoted R0. Ebola has a relatively low R0
21, falling in the range of 1.5 to 2. In 
contrast, a disease like measles has an R0 of 18 and HIV has an R0 of 4.
21 This means that if 
an individual is infectious, they could pass the disease on to 18 and 4 people, respectively. 
The variable of R0 is based on many different factors such as how long the individual with 
the disease is contagious and how many particles of the virus is required to infect someone 
(this variable determines how infectious a virus is), along with several other factors.21 Ebola, 
although highly infectious, is not highly contagious and is controllable with the appropriate 
responses from health care professionals.20 
      The biocontainment facilities have the best equipment, protocols and highly trained 
personnel to help prevent the spread of disease that normal hospitals would not be prepared 
for. The four biocontainment hospitals in the United States include the National Institutes of 
Health in Bethesda, Maryland, Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, University of 
Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska, and the Saint Patrick Hospital in Missoula, 
Montana.22 Several features make these facilities the best to treat diseases such as Ebola.  
First, they utilize negative pressure rooms where clean air enters the patient’s room, but air 
with possible infected particles cannot get out to the rest of the hospital. There are also 
closed-circuit video cameras so the patient can be closely monitored, and glass windows and 
intercom connections allow healthcare personnel to interact with the patient without PPE.22 




precautions to ensure safe disposal of wastes by first sanitizing with pressurized steam then 
incinerating it. Liquid waste is treated with bleach or detergent. The University of Nebraska 
Medical Center biocontainment unit has “biopods” or “isopods” that are basically giant 
bubbles that stay inflated thanks to negative air pressure.22 This allows patients to leave their 
rooms safely. They also have a sanitation system in which equipment leaving the unit is 
sanitized and sterilized with high-pressure steam.22 All of the biocontainment facilities are 
also in close proximity to a Biosafety level 3 or 4 laboratory where specimens from infected 
patients can be researched.22 While these four hospitals are ready to treat highly infectious 
and contagious diseases alike, combined these facilities can only handle less than a dozen 
Ebola patients at a time, 23 which suggests that not only West Texas, but the United States as 
a whole would not be ready for an Ebola epidemic. Taylor Wilson, who is a spokesperson for 
the Nebraska Medical Center in Omaha says that “With Ebola, it is pretty labor intensive. A 
lot of waste is created; a lot of equipment has to be in the patient room so that number [of 
patients that can be treated at this facility] goes down quite a bit.”23 
  Because of the unfavorable outcomes of the case of Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan in 
Dallas including his death as well as person-to-person transmission, there is a push to rely on 
the biocontainment facilities.23 Some experts say that all Ebola patients should be treated 
only in a biocontainment facility rather than in a community hospital like Mr. Duncan was.24 
Dr. Alexander Garza, the Associate Dean and Professor in Epidemiology at Saint Louis 
University, agrees with this idea, for the following reasons: hospitals are poorly prepared to 
take care of a patient with a disease such as Ebola; community healthcare resources would be 




center will lower the risk for community health care workers.24 Although the person-to-
person transmission of Ebola in Dallas was due to extensive contact with Mr. Duncan when 
he had excessive production of bodily fluids such as vomit and diarrhea, the CDC tightened 
its previous protocols and guidance for infection control following the outbreak, with the 
main change being training and education. The new guidance is centered on three main ideas: 
“All healthcare workers undergo rigorous training and are practiced and competent with PPE, 
including putting it on and taking it off in a systematic manner. No skin exposure when PPE 
is worn and all workers are supervised by a trained monitor who watches each worker putting 
PPE on and taking it off.” 25 
Handling of Ebola specimens 
When the diagnosis is suspected, reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction and 
antigen detection by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay are the most useful tests.3 The 
Ebola virus can be detected in the blood in as few as 3 days after symptoms. Ideally, a 
specimen should be taken from a possible Ebola patient as soon as they report to a healthcare 
setting (staff who collect these specimens should wear PPE discussed earlier). If the result 
comes up negative and the symptoms have not been apparent for at least 3 days, a later test 
might need to be performed. The virus can be diagnosed using real time PCR and FDA 
approved Emergency Use Only assay to detect the virus.26 Ebola specimens to be shipped to 
the CDC should be shipped at 2-8° Celsius on cold-packs that are not in glass containers. 
They should be in a durable, leak proof secondary container.26 Presumptive testing for the 




be confirmed through the CDC so further decisions about the treatment and/or transport of 
the patient can be discussed.26 
 The CDC created a four tier system of classifying laboratories based on levels of 
containment present when working with certain pathogenic agents, with Biosafety level 4 
laboratories being the highest level where work with life threatening infectious diseases, 
especially those without a vaccine, is done.27 A clinical specimen of Ebola must be handled 
in a Containment Level 2 laboratory, but no virus culture should be attempted outside of a 
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL 4) laboratory.28 Biosafety Level 2 (BSL 2) is suitable to perform 
work that involves agents that have moderate risks and hazards for personnel and the 
environment, and laboratory personnel must have specific training in handling infectious 
agents and the procedures to be followed.29 Researchers in BSL-4 laboratories are required to 
wear protective equipment which entails a full body suit that has air-supplied positive 
pressure and to undergo extensive training in protocols and handling of these infectious 
specimens.27 The National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories is a national network 
that includes secured facilities that do research on infectious diseases. In this network, there 
are 11 BSL-4 laboratories, with three of them being in Texas. Galveston has two locations 
while San Antonio has one.27 
There are two models of BSL-4 laboratories, a cabinet laboratory and a suit 
laboratory, with each having a special design to prevent the infectious agents from getting 
out into the environment. The cabinet laboratory is one in which all interactions with the 
pathogens must be performed in the Class III biological safety cabinet. Both the BSL-4 suit 




for the given work space where all personnel dealing with the infectious materials wear a 
positive pressure air protective suit.27 Many rules in these laboratories are standard across 
laboratories at any level: no eating, drinking, smoking in the lab, or applying makeup. 
Protocols are in place for what to do if glassware is broken or if there is a spill, and 
decontamination of work surfaces is stressed.  As for the Ebola-associated waste disposal, the 
exact protocols are not concrete. The CDC recommends that the hospital where the waste 
accumulated needs to adhere to state and local regulations and is subject to requirements of 
the Hazardous Materials Regulations until the waste is no longer considered to be hazardous 
or a threat.30 
When dealing with Ebola blood cultures, it is recommended that these be prepared in 
a closed system, and any handling of Ebola is not done on an open bench.28 When separating 
samples from Ebola patients, it must be done in a sealed centrifuge in a certified workspace 
and the laboratory must keep a log including who has handled, decontaminated or transported 
the Ebola specimens.28 Overall, many precautions must to be taken into consideration when 
handling an Ebola specimen. Rigorous protocols and training are involved in the disposal, 
transportation, and handling of possible Ebola specimens. 
 
Why this survey in West Texas? 
Knowing of the vast resources, education, and medical personnel needed to treat a 
patient with Ebola, West Texas residents may be a little skeptical of the preparedness of this 
rural area to care for a patient with an infectious disease of this caliber. Some may be 




the outbreak in October 2014, this disease seemed too close for comfort. Thomas Eric 
Duncan, the first case diagnosed in Dallas, had a son who plays football at Angelo State 
University. His son, Karsiah Duncan, went to visit his dad, but Dr. Brian May, the President 
of Angelo State University asked him to stay in Dallas for two weeks, while people from the 
CDC also quarantined Karsiah Duncan and his family for 21 days.6 What if he had come into 
contact with his father and come back to school at Angelo State, in close contact with his 
classmates, roommate, and teammates? Could the Ebola virus have been brought back to 
rural San Angelo? Another tie to West Texas is patient, Dr. Kent Brantley, who too was 
infected with the Ebola virus. He is an Abilene Christian University alumnus with family in 
West Texas. With these ties to the Ebola outbreak, it seemed probable that this disease could 
come to a rural West Texas hospital with limited resources to care for a disease of this 
magnitude. Based on the literature review of resources and protocols needed to treat an Ebola 
patient, I hypothesized that rural West Texas hospitals would be unprepared to treat a disease 
of this magnitude. 
The goals of this study were as follows: 
1. To examine the preparedness of West Texas hospitals to diagnose and treat an 
Ebola patient, based on implementation of recommendations and protocols for the 
handling of a patient with Ebola and specimens of the virus. 







A background literature review was conducted in which the investigator researched 
information about the Ebola virus along with protocols and precautions that would need to be 
followed with a suspected Ebola patient. From the information obtained from the literature, 
pertinent questions were developed to best assess health care facilities preparedness. Once 
these questions were generated, a survey was designed and created (Fig. 1) based on the 
literature review. The questionnaire was intended to interview the preparedness of 15 
hospitals in prominent towns and cities within a 100-mile radius of San Angelo, Texas by 
speaking with their chief nursing officers.  These hospitals were chosen, as they represent 
nearly all of the hospitals within the given radius of San Angelo. In addition, these were the 
15 most established health care facilities in the area. 
 The survey assesses changes implemented after the Ebola scare in October 2014, as 
well as precautions and protocols for an Ebola patient in these rural health care facilities and 
the overall preparedness of these hospitals to house an Ebola patient. The survey was 
conducted via phone call with given health care facilities’ chief nursing officer. People in this 
position were chosen to interview because the position is consistent among all hospitals. Not 
all small rural hospitals have an infection control officer, but they do have chief nursing 
officers. It was assumed that those in this position underwent the same training and hold 
comparable positions at their given facilities. In addition, it was expected that those in this 
position would be easier to get in contact with and would have knowledge of the 
preparedness in regards to what we were surveying at each facility. Each hospital was 




conducted via the Angelo State University online library database, RAMCAT31, using the 
keywords Ebola, preparedness, public health and Texas to assess the social implications and 
public health aspects that this outbreak placed on our society not only in West Texas, but also 
throughout the U.S. and other nations. Finally, three separate interviews were conducted to 
get an inside look at social implications, preparedness and protocols, and what it was like to 
experience the October 2014 Ebola scare firsthand. Chris Washington, Strategic National 
Stockpile Coordinator in Dallas, who previously was an Emergency Health Coordinator, was 
interviewed. He works for the Department of State Health Services. He was interviewed to 
provide insight about what happened at the state level with the October 2014 scare and to 
receive more of an unbiased view of how prepared the hospitals of West Texas would be in 
comparison to the biocontainment facilities. The second interview was with Karsiah Duncan, 
son of Ebola patient Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan, who experienced the chaos when Ebola came 
to America and directly affected his family.  The third interview was conducted with Dr. 
Brian May, president of Angelo State University, to get a better idea of the social 
implications and stigmas a disease like Ebola can place not only on the people, but a 
community and a university. 
 
RESULTS 
Results from West Texas Hospitals regarding preparedness for an Ebola outbreak 
The questionnaire sent to the various health care facilities was created by compiling 
pertinent questions that asses preparedness, based on recommendations found through the 




least five times if no response was received initially, a response to the questionnaire was 
obtained from 8 of the 15 hospitals (See appendix A). The questionnaire was standard 
amongst all of the hospitals, while also allowing for separate and additional commentary 
from some of the sources (Table 1). The average preparedness the hospitals reported for their 
ability to receive a patient with the Ebola virus was 3.8 on a scale of 0 to 5 and the adequacy 
of PPE at their health care facility was 4.375. The overall global preparedness of the eight 
hospitals was reported as a 4. The extent to which protocols changed after the outbreak in 
October 2014 was 4.375. The standard deviation for the values obtained was relatively 
similar with the exception of the response about having an adequate amount of PPE on hand 






































*Indicates fewer than 8 hospitals answered this question. The number in parenthesis indicates how many 












How prepared is 
your facility to 
receive a patient 
with the Ebola 
virus? 
3.8 5.0 3.0 0.65 
Do you have an 
adequate amount of 
PPE on hand? 





3.625 5.0 3.0 0.95 
Persons on staff as 
an infection 
preventionist (7)* 




4 5.0 3.0 0.58 
Extent to which 
protocols changed 
with the outbreak 
in the October 2014 
(7)* 
4.375 5.0 3.0 0.90 
Would you 
consider the 
protocol to dispose 
of materials that the 
Ebola patient 
contaminated or the 
decontamination of 
the area they were 
in to be intensive 
and strict? 




Answers from the questionnaire and additional commentary 
 Changes implemented after the October 2014 outbreak were common among the 
eight hospitals contacted. All eight hospitals instituted an Ebola protocol that included 
coordination with local EMS. All of the health care facilities also implemented other training 
for staff that included, but was not limited to, drills and education about the disease. Seventy-
five percent of the hospitals included training in donning and doffing of PPE, and 88% now 
have a questionnaire about travel history for incoming patients. Regarding the disposal and 
clean up of Ebola materials, 50% of the hospitals had a contract with a company who would 
come in to de-contaminate and sanitize the area where the Ebola patient was treated. Twelve 
and a half percent of the hospitals used housekeeping to clean up and the remaining 37.5% 
utilized the fire department for clean up. Regardless of the people who came in to 
decontaminate the area, 100% of the hospitals required whoever was cleaning up after the 
Ebola patient to wear full PPE as described in the introduction to this study.  Additionally, 
100% of the hospitals would have to transfer their patient to a larger hospital for treatment. 
 
Common course of action proposed by West Texas health care facilities 
The course of action that would be taken by the rural health care facilities in West 
Texas is essentially the same, based on the follow-up discussion when performing the 
interview. They would house the patient in the Emergency Room in a separate room that is 
isolated to the best of the hospital’s ability. The hospital personnel would then determine 
how they would safely transfer the patient based on protocols in place, which includes the 




transported by ambulance or by helicopter to a larger, more equipped hospital within 24 
hours. The rural health care facilities would either transport the patient to a larger hospital in 
West Texas that is in close proximity or to a hospital that is designated to treat infectious 
agents of this caliber (the four biocontainment facilitates discussed earlier). The CDC would 
also be contacted as soon as the diagnosis is made to get their input on proper course of 
action. Once the patient has been transported, clean up would be essential to decontaminate 
the area infected by the Ebola patient. As seen in the results, the local fire department, a 
contracted company or the housekeeping department at the hospital would be responsible for 
cleanup. 
 
Commentary from Chris Washington- A look into the outbreak from the state level 
 An interview was conducted with Mr. Chris Washington from the Department of 
State Health Services to provide an unbiased, state level perspective on West Texas Ebola 
preparedness. 32 His office is in direct contact with all of the local hospitals, and these 
hospitals have a list of diseases that they must report to the region or state. If one of these 
diseases were reported, his office is responsible to immediately make sure proper procedures 
are in place and that unnecessary people are not exposed. The biggest responsibility his 
office has when faced with a reportable disease is to make sure the patient gets onto a plane 
to be shipped to a facility that can provide better care, while also working hand in hand with 
the CDC.  
 With the outbreak in October 2014, he noted the scare associated with the outbreak 




began to think that if someone were infected with the Ebola virus, others around them would 
inevitably be infected. Mr. Washington stated that Ebola really should not be feared in the 
United States unless it mutates to a form that is highly contagious and that could be passed 
through a cough, for example. False information and lack of education ran rampant through 
the general public with the October 2014 outbreak, contributing largely to the widespread 
fear. Mr. Washington and his colleagues attempted to correctly inform patients and the 
general public. Changes implemented after the outbreak included an Ebola grant for health 
care facilities that provided money to plan specifically for Ebola. It was a governmental grant 
used to plan and educate about high consequence diseases, which are those that can cause a 
high amount of deaths in a short period of time. State health officials also went out to each of 
the eleven regions where they held a conference to educate about these diseases. Experts 
came to talk and there were tabletop exercises simulating what a patient would go through 
and what would happen in the event these diseases came to local healthcare facilities.  
 If the events of 2014 were to happen today, Texas hospitals would definitely be more 
prepared, according to Mr. Washington. If at all possible, the patient would be immediately 
shipped to areas that are better equipped and have undergone specific training to treat 
diseases of this magnitude. Due to a lack of effective communication at the health care 
facility that was treating Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan, health care workers were infected. Health 
care facilities already knew prior to the October 2014 outbreak that a patient could have 
Ebola if they had recently been to West Africa and presented the proper symptoms. Donning 
and doffing was already a common practice. While health officials already had protocols in 




awareness and that communication is key when faced with a disease of the magnitude of 
Ebola.  The country is now more aware because is it known that this disease can happen in 
America. However, when asked about his thoughts about the preparedness of rural West 
Texas to receive a patient with Ebola, he did not seem impressed with the results generated 
from the survey. He stated that none of them are actually prepared when compared on a 
global scale and to the specialized centers ready to receive patients with high consequence 
diseases. While Washington does believe that the mass training implemented helped with 
awareness and that individual hospitals may have done more on their own to be prepared, the 
hospitals are not equipped to treat an Ebola patient. He stated that there are only 4 to 5 
locations in the United States that can adequately handle an Ebola patient.  
 Receiving a patient with Ebola affects a community health care facility greatly. It is a 
huge drain economically; it exposes the facilities to the virus and the stigma, and requires a 
great deal of manpower. It is also a significant social drain due to the negative stigmas and 
social media and media outlets that alter the stories and the realities of the disease. Overall, 
Ebola is a serious disease, but with proper health care, it should be restricted to the hospital 
setting and not spread to the general public. If it were to infect the general public, yes, it 
would be of great concern. But in October 2014, in Texas, the disease infected one person 
who came from West Africa (Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan) and only infected two others in the 
United States. This deadly disease only spread to Nina Pham and one other health care 
worker, Amber Vinson, through the index case in Texas. No matter what, in Mr. 






What are the social implications of Ebola? 
The Ebola virus does not only affect those in the medical profession. The implications 
extend beyond the scope of a community health care setting or a biocontainment center. A 
virus of this caliber is categorized as a “viral hemorrhagic fever,” which is a category of 
diseases that have historically caught health care facilities off guard.33 These outbreaks are 
usually fraught with misdiagnosis, patient morbidity, and the secondary infection of health 
care workers wearing various levels of PPE.33 The outbreak of Ebola in the United States in 
October 2014 was accompanied by a series of errors in the diagnosis. Mr. Duncan, the index 
case in the United States, progressed from initial symptoms to explosive diarrhea and 
projectile vomiting in three days, prior to diagnosis. In his case, there was initial 
misdiagnosis, miscommunication, and a treatment delay.33 If exposure to infected bodily 
fluids occurs, this could be problematic and infection could occur. However, the means of 
transmission of diseases of this category are often misunderstood. For Ebola, as discussed 
earlier, its means of transmission is via direct contact with bodily fluids of an infected person 
(i.e. someone who is actively showing the symptoms of this virus). Because of the lack of 
education about the disease, many Americans believe this is a highly contagious disease and 
that merely being in the presence of someone with Ebola guarantees you will contract the 
disease. This inadequate information and awareness about this disease can largely be 
attributed to social media, media outlets, and public figures, rather than receiving pertinent 
information from highly respected sources such as the World Health Organization or the 




consequence of poorly managed or inadequate public health intelligence can result in under-
reliance on reputable sources of intelligence and over-reliance on less vetted sources of 
information like the internet, social media, talk radio, and cable news outlets. When CNN 
becomes a more trusted news source on a public health crisis than the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, we have a major problem.” 34 This miseducation leads to major 
social implications that also have political and economic effects on society.  
Major social implications of the disease surround the stigmatization of the Ebola 
virus. “The word [Ebola] is enough to cause worldwide fear and ignite heated political debate 
in the U.S.”35 The stigma began in West Africa where the worst and largest Ebola outbreak to 
date began in December 2013 and was first detected in March 2014 when cases were 
recognized in southern Guinea. According to del Rio et al., “The challenge is unprecedented 
because these countries have some of the worst physician–patient ratios in West Africa (more 
than 86,000 patients per physician in Liberia and 45,000 patients per physician in Sierra 
Leone).”3 While the initial stigma of the disease was localized in West Africa, the airlifting of 
two patients to Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, in October 2014 brought an 
unprecedented level of media attention to Ebola as well as concern for its potential spread in 
the U.S. population. This widespread fear was similar to the reaction to recent reports of 
Chikungunya diagnoses in U.S. citizens.7 In a poll in November 2014, “the U.S. public 
ranked Ebola as the third most urgent health problem facing the country--just below cost and 
access and higher than any other disease, including cancer or heart disease, which together 
account for nearly half of all U.S. deaths each year.”36 A reason for this incredibly high 




or education about the disease, including its means of transmission, since 85% of those 
polled said they were likely to get Ebola if an infected person sneezed or coughed on them.36 
These thoughts are not entirely correct as Ebola has not been proven to be airborne. 
However, if someone projectile vomits, coughs, or sneezes directly onto another individual 
and these particles reach a person’s mucous membranes or through an open cut or wound, the 
person is at risk. It is thought that the media played a crucial role in instilling fear and public 
concern during the 2014 outbreak by running many stories about Ebola.36 
This fear has created great concern in American society that has led to people from 
West Africa in the United States facing discrimination, even though only one of the 
thousands of Ebola casualties occurred in the United States. With Ebola coming to the United 
States, “African immigrants experienced stigma similar to communities stigmatized by the 
AIDS epidemic in the ‘80s… in the early stages of the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa 
and amid sensationalized reports, we found a fear linked with African immigrants around 
spreading the disease in the U.S. Some of these populations felt like they had to hide their 
ethnicity in an effort to avoid the stigma.”37 Not only did those from West Africa and other 
Ebola affected regions of Africa feel like they had to hide their ethnicity here in the United 
States, but children were teased at school, and adults were the butt of jokes at work, resulting 
in stress and hardships for these populations.36 The United States Justice Department had to 
go as far as to issue guidelines in December 2014 that were designed to help government 
workers avoid illegally discriminating against people because of the Ebola virus by advising 
against Ebola-related bullying or harassment of people who are from West Africa.38 Some 




from Africa or African descent, even though public health officials had not issued a 
quarantine; schools putting teachers on leave after traveling to African countries that weren’t 
even affected by the virus;38 slurs against West Africans in neighborhoods and 
communities;39 people avoiding people of West African descent; yelling discriminatory 
comments like “African, go back to Africa with your Ebola;”39 or even college admissions 
offices, such as in Navarro, Texas, stopping accepting applications from any African 
students.40 Those suffering from the disease in Africa have noted that people are afraid to 
come near them, or have anything to do with them for fear of catching the disease. They 
further claim that the “…stigma is worse that the fever.”40 Similar stigmas like those in 
Africa have surfaced in the United States, although on a lesser scale due to the smaller 
magnitude of the outbreak. 
 An interview with Karsiah Duncan, son of the index case Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan, 
exposed the immense social implications of the disease and is of particular relevance to West 
Texas as he is a student at Angelo State University. Karsiah stated that several newspapers 
were in contact with his family and the CDC was in heavy contact with the family after the 
diagnosis was reported. Karsiah said the publicity was out of control and they could not even 
get out of their house because of the chaos this diagnosis brought to America.41 Similarly, Dr. 
Brian May, President of Angelo State University, also dealt with the negative social stigmas 
of Ebola.  Dr. May said that because Angelo State had a connection to Mr. Thomas Eric 
Duncan through his son, fear was generated through the media and he had to fight that. He 
perceived a temporary negative stigma towards the university because of the publicity of the 




media, and negative stigma, were the same challenges that faced the San Angelo community 
at that time. The fact that Mr. Duncan had a son at Angelo State was headline news all over 
the state and even the country. Dr. May also stated that the fear had people wanting to stop 
all airlines from leaving and entering the Dallas area. Although this was an unfortunate 
scenario, Dr. May stated that our country learned a lot from the outbreak. He believes that we 
are now more prepared for this disease because we learned how it is transmitted thanks to 
science, rather than just believing everything the media puts out, which was a contributor to 
the widespread fear and negative stigma. We also learned how to specifically treat the 
disease and proved that we can treat it. He believes the negative stigma that still lingers 
around the disease is because of the death of Mr. Duncan. The American people forget that 
infected persons survived this outbreak in October 2014. He believes we are now more 
adequately prepared and aware in West Texas and that the only thing we have to fear is fear 
itself.42 
However, this stigma extends beyond social implications. Ebola poses economic 
implications as well. Because of the social stigma, members of society oftentimes will alter 
their normal, everyday behaviors, such as staying home from work or school or canceling a 
trip, which has economic effects.43 The fear of Ebola has the potential to hinder productivity 
because some children are being kept home from school because of the fear of contagion. 
Therefore, parents must then stay home from work, which could affect the level of workplace 
productivity.43 The fear in October 2014 was also thought to have affected Wall Street as 
airline stocks dropped most likely due to fears of catching this disease. When people choose 




“the economic effect of Ebola in the hardest hit countries of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra 
Leone, would be ‘catastrophic’ in a global economy that could impact American 
companies.”43 While there are broad economic impacts, there are also direct costs that are 
associated with the disease, such as the cost of quarantine. With Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan’s 
case, as many as 177 people had to be quarantined and go through the 21-day watch period to 
make sure no one was infected with the virus. In all, it is estimated that this Ebola flare up 
cost Dallas County more than $1 million.44 This makes one wonder how hard hit the United 
States economy would be if an Ebola outbreak did in fact come to our soil.  
When addressing Filovirus outbreaks, such as Ebola, the public must be aware that 
such outbreaks produce an enormous amount of fear, in part due to the fact that many 
communities are unfamiliar with the techniques used to manage them. According to Vanessa 
and Matthias, “Efforts to sensitize the community to control efforts and establish a trusting, 
respectful relationship between the community and outbreak control team are of paramount 
importance.”10 There is often misunderstanding, stigma, and distrust during outbreaks of this 
magnitude. It takes a community effort to confront a disease that comes with heavy 
implications such as Ebola. As Vanessa and Matthias show: 
“To establish a trusting relationship with the community and facilitate the acceptance 
of control efforts, measures must be transparent and culturally sensitive…There is 
significant benefit to providing psychosocial support to patients, family members, and 
health workers...Involvement of community leaders can help mobilize persons to 
adopt measures to protect themselves, including acceptance of the isolation ward. 
Regular reports through media outlets are another possible route of social 
mobilization; however this reporting needs to be conducted in an organized, ethical 
manner, so that the media may aid rather than hinder outbreak management. It is 
always important to convey a message of hope rather than fear; filoviral disease is 






So, is West Texas prepared? 
Before this study, it was suspected that if Ebola were to come to West Texas through 
connections of Dr. Kent Brantley and Mr. Duncan, regional hospitals and clinics would be 
completely unprepared and this disease would have the potential to cause a serious outbreak. 
While the results were more promising than suspected, it would be erroneous to say that rural 
West Texas is completely prepared and equipped. The Thomas Eric Duncan case indicates 
that even urban hospitals were unprepared to treat Ebola before the October 2014 outbreak, 
seeing that a man died and other health care personnel on the case were also infected. 
However, Chris Washington’s discussions of the reform of health care facilities after the 
outbreak offers hope for many health care settings in the United States. That raises the 
question, is West Texas now prepared? Evidence suggests that rural West Texas would not 
be adequately prepared to treat an Ebola patient, but would have enough resources to 
potentially house an Ebola patient until transfer to a better prepared facility equipped with 
isolated, negative flow rooms, Biosafety level 2 labs, and related equipment required to 
adequately treat an Ebola patient. Vast changes were implemented for the treatment of an 
Ebola patient after the outbreak in 2014, which included education, training, and overall 
awareness of the infectious disease. The overall, global assessment of preparedness that looks 
at the readiness of the West Texas hospitals compared to those in more developed areas was 
a 3.5 on a 5.0 scale, showing that rural West Texas is not up to par with those hospitals 
designated to treat and quarantine the infectious agents. West Texas’ preparedness to receive 
a patient after the outbreak rated 3.8, which is better than anticipated. However, officials at 




outbreak of 2014 their hospital would rate 0 out of 5 in terms of preparedness to treat a 
patient with Ebola (this question was a late addition to the survey, asked to hospitals 
contacted later in the research). Obviously, the outbreak in 2014 resulted in the 
implementation of changes that were essential to the preparedness of West Texas, although 
the hospitals certainly do not measure up to hospitals such as Emory, who are ready and 
equipped to take on a patient with the Ebola virus.  
Although this survey provides insight into the preparedness of rural West Texas 
health care facilities, the validity of this information is not entirely reliable. This was a small 
sample size, with only a little over half of the contacted hospitals actually completing the 
survey. Also, it was assumed that the chief nursing officers who did answer the survey knew 
what was needed for their respective hospitals to be classified as “prepared.” With any 
survey, there is always the possibility of bias, especially when discussing an infectious 
disease that has social implications and stigmas. There is no way to eliminate this from the 
survey, but one must be aware that this bias could skew results, most likely in the direction 
that portrays their hospitals as “more prepared”. While these results are from a small sample 
size and could include bias, the hospitals surveyed suggest that rural West Texas may in fact 
be prepared to handle an Ebola patient for a short amount of time before transfer. With the 
implementation of mass training following the October 2014 outbreak and the addition of 
necessary infection control officers along with maintaining adequate PPE on hand, the survey 
results seem promising for an area that was hypothesized to be ill prepared. The fact that the 
hospitals reported their preparedness to receive an Ebola patient as a 3.8 is more promising 




care facility today, after the implementation of vast changes (4.375 reported as the extent of 
their changes after the Ebola October 2014 outbreak on the scale of 0 to 5). With these 
promising improvements in equipment and recognition, there is hope that missteps will no 
longer allow a patient to succumb to the fatal effects of Ebola, as Mr. Thomas Eric Duncan 
did, or allow for Ebola to spread from patient to health care facility workers.  
 
Limitations of the study 
 While the survey results proved more promising than expected, treating an Ebola 
patient would likely be too overwhelming for a rural health care setting in West Texas to 
adequately care for an Ebola patient for an extended period. Manpower and other resources 
needed are just too vast to treat even a single case of Ebola. While health care facilities in 
West Texas may be able to adequately receive a patient, it is in the patient’s and hospital’s 
best interest to transport the patient to a biocontainment facility elsewhere in the United 
States that is better equipped to treat a disease of this caliber. Although West Texas is not 
ready to successfully treat an Ebola outbreak, hospitals and clinics have implemented 
significant changes in regards to training that would better equip and prepare these facilities 
for short term management of a patient. Nonetheless, the occurrence of an outbreak in West 
Texas would pose significant problems.  
Future studies could be conducted in which additional questions would be asked to 
better understand the preparedness of West Texas to treat an Ebola patient and to assess the 
degree of change after the October 2014 outbreak While widespread training was 




preparedness before and after the October 2014 outbreak. For example, rating overall 
preparedness before and after the outbreak would be beneficial to this study, along with 
details about what materials and resources needed to treat an Ebola patient were at their 
healthcare facilities before and after the outbreak. Also more details about PPE available 
would be useful to better assess how well the facility could house a single Ebola patient 
versus multiple patients in an outbreak at their facility. This should include questions such as 
how much PPE is needed per health care professional to treat a patient, and how many health 
care professionals are needed to treat the patient. Some of the hospitals could not answer 
what specific PPE they had and how many sets of PPE they had at hand, yet stated that they 
felt they had an adequate amount of PPE on hand. Additionally, questions should be asked 
addressing the preparedness of the hospital in regards to their ability to obtain Ebola 
specimens, testing the specimen, and the overall process of handling the specimen. To 
decrease bias, a larger number of hospitals could be surveyed by a single evaluator with 
known infectious disease skills. This person could physically go to each hospital to assess the 
criteria found to determine if a facility is prepared to receive and treat a patient with Ebola. 
 
Relevance and Conclusions 
According to Carney and Weber, “Today’s public health crises, as exemplified by the 
Ebola outbreak, lead to dramatic calls to action that typically include improved electronic 
monitoring systems to better prepare for, and respond to, similar occurrences in the future. 
Even a preliminary public health informatics evaluation of the current Ebola crisis exposes 




The need for enhanced coordination, improved electronic monitoring systems, and overall 
preparedness is essential for West Texas. Research exploring the preparedness of West Texas 
is essential because many diseases uncommon to most of the United States are first 
encountered in Texas, largely due to its border with Mexico and the influx of people from 
Central and South America as well as the changing boundaries for vectors that transmit 
disease. This may have implications for several other diseases, such as the latest emerging 
disease, Zika.  
While West Texas initially seemed to be unprepared for a disease of the magnitude of 
Ebola, the results are promising. After the outbreak in October 2014, West Texas underwent 
massive training and education in order to be better prepared for a hypothetical Ebola 
outbreak. While the social stigma associated with the disease was evident during the 
outbreak, education about the transmission and the training of health care professionals can 
help alleviate these fears. Regardless, while West Texas is better prepared for an Ebola 
outbreak, a disease of this magnitude is best treated at a fully equipped biocontainment center 
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The survey was sent to the following 15 hospitals:  
Abilene Regional Medical Center 
Ballinger Memorial Hospital 
Brownwood Regional Medical Center 
Coleman County Medical Center 
Community Medical Center (San Angelo) 
Heart of Texas Memorial Hospital (Brady) 
Iraan General Hospital 
Lillian M. Hudspeth Memorial Hospital (Sonora) 
Medical Arts Hospital (Lamesa) 
Midland Memorial Hospital 
Reagan Memorial Hospital (Big Lake) 
Rolling Plains Memorial Hospital (Sweetwater) 
Scenic Mountain Medical Center (Big Spring) 
Schleicher County Medical Center (Eldorado) 
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